

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 HA-05 MMO-01 ACDA-12 AID-05
TRSE-00 EB-08 OMB-01 DLOS-09 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
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R 211410Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4393
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ROME 13449

PASS ACDA AND AID WASH D.C.

JCS FOR J-5: USCINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7

E.O. 11652: GDS-85
TAGS:
SUBJECT: SA REPORTING

REF: (A) STATE 167901/010215Z JUL 78; (B) STATE 168320/
031928Z JUL 78 (C) USCINCEUR 071545Z JUL 78 NOTAL: (D)
USCINCEUR 131635Z JUL 78 NOTAL (E) STATE 182987/192201Z
JUL 78 (F) ROME A-361 NOTAL (G) ROME A-133 NOTAL.

1. FOLLOWING IF FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED BY REF (A) AND ELABORATED
ON IN REFS (B) A THROUGH (E). SUBPARAGRAPH LETTERING/
NUMBERING KEYED TO FORMAT OF REF (A).

A. (1) U.S. INTERESTS TO BE SERVED BY A SECURITY ASSISTANCE
(SA) RELATIONSHIP WITH ITALY CENTER/ON ITALY'S MEMBERSHIP
IN NATO AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. SPECIFIC SA
OBJECTIVES ARE TO (A) ASSIST ITALY TO MAINTAIN A STRONG,
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STABLE GOVERNMENT, FIRMLY ALIGNED WITH NATO AND THE UNITED
STATES (B) ASSIST ITALY TO MAINTAIN COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT
FORCES CAPABLE OF MEETING NATO-ASSIGNED DEFENSE TASKS (C) ASSIST
ITALY TO MAINTAIN A RESPONSIVE MOBILIZATION BASE (D) OBTAIN
NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS, AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR
US AND ALLIED FORCES AND ENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO US
INTERESTS (E) ASSIST ITALY TO DEFEND CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA

AREAS AND MARITIME/AIR ROUTES ADJACENT TO ITALY (F)
CONTINUALLY IMPROVE COUNTRY CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC
SUPPORT FOR ITALIAN AS WELL AS US AND ALLIED FORCES.

A. (2) ITALIAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP RECOGNIZES
THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES POSE THE
GREATEST THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH THE WEIGHT OF THE
MILITARY THREAT IS THE HEAVIEST IN THE CENTRAL REGION, ITALY
FEELS THAT THERE IS A GREATER RISK OF A CONFLICT STARTING IN
THE SOUTHERN REGION THAN IN THE OTHER TWO AREAS, SINCE IT IS
THE LEAST STABLE AREA. ITALY IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH
THE GROWTH OVER THE YEARS OF THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL
SQUADRON AND THE POTENTIAL FOR POST-TITO INSTABILITY IN
YUGOSLAVIA. CONSEQUENTLY, NATO REMAINS A KEY ELEMENT IN
ITALY'S DEFENSE PLANS. ANOTHER MAJOR FACTOR IN ITS DEFENSE
POLICY HAS BEEN ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES:
IT CONSIDERS THAT THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR GUARANTEE AND THE
PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN EUROPE ARE NECESSARY FOR THE EFFECTIVE
DEFENSE OF THE ITALIAN MAINLAND. TO BLOCK ITS MAIN PERCEIVED
THREAT FROM THE NORTHEAST, ITALY HAS ASSIGNED THE BULK OF ITS
GROUND AND AIR ASSETS IN THE NORTH. THE ITALIAN MILITARY
ESTIMATES THAT IN A MAJOR CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE THE
SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO SEIZE NORTHERN ITALY IN ORDER TO PROTECT
THEIR FLANK. ITALY ALSO RECOGNIZES THAT IN ANY CONFLICT AUSTRIA'S
NEUTRALITY MOST LIKELY WOULD BE VIOLATED. ALTHOUGH THE ARMED
FORCES FEEL THAT YUGOSLAVIA WOULD RESIST ANY SOVIET VENTURE
THROUGH THAT COUNTRY, THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POST-TITO
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ERA AND WHETHER THE COUNTRY CAN MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENT STANCE.
SHOULD YUGOSLAVIA SWING CLOSER TO THE SOVIET BLOC, THE MILITARY
FEELS THAT THE COUNTRY THEN FACES AN EVEN GREATER THREAT. THE
INTERNAL THREAT POSED BY THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IS VIEWED
BY DIFFERENT LEADERS WITH DIFFERING LEVELS OF SERIOUSNESS.

A. (3) THE MISSION VIEWS THE MILITARY THREAT TO ITALY AS
EVOLVING FROM THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN ANY CONFLICT WITH
NATO OF ACHIEVING UNRESTRICTED FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN THE
CENTRAL AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO
BE CONCERNED WITH PROTECTING THE FLANK OF THEIR MAIN THRUST
INTO CENTRAL EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THEIR
MEDITERRANEAN OBJECTIVE, THE SOVIETS WOULD MOST LIKELY CONDUCT
AIR ATTACKS AGAINST NATO AIRFIELDS TO NEUTRALIZE THE NUCLEAR
WEAPON DELIVERY CAPABILITY. AIR ATTACKS WOULD ALSO BE CONDUCTED
AGAINST LOGISTICAL AND TRANSPORTATION INSTALLATIONS TO RESTRICT
NATO'S REINFORCEMENT/RESUPPLY CAPABILITY AND SPECIFICALLY THE
SUPPORT TO NATO FLEET ELEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. SINCE
ONE OF THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO SOVIET UNRESTRICTED USE OF
THE MEDITERRANEAN WOULD BE NATO'S NAVAL FORCES, ITALIAN FLEET
ASSETS WOULD ALSO BE ATTACKED. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY
HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS TO SEND GROUND FORCES INTO NORTHERN ITALY IN
THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT IN EUROPE, SUCH AN ATTACK MAY NOT ACTUALLY

BE CONDUCTED UNLESS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION WULD
SO DICTATE. IN ADDITION TO THE EXTERNAL THREAT, THERE ARE
INTERNAL THREATS POSED BY THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI)
AND EXTREMIST GROUPS OF RIGHT AND LEFT. THE MOST SERIOUS OF
THESE IS THE PCI THREAT AND ITS PRESSURE FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION
IN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION.

A. (4) THE ITALIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS TAILORED TO CUNTER
THE EXTERNAL THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY ITALIAN LEADERSHIP AND TO
SUPPORT NATO STRATEGIC PLANS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, ARMY AND AIR
FORCE UNITS ARE TAILORED FOR DEFENSE AGAINST AN EXPECTED THREAT
FROM THE NORTH. THE NAVY IS TAILORED FOR SEA CONTROL IN WATERS
ADJACENT TO ITALY AND IN SUPPORT OF NATO MARITIME STRATEGY TO
ACHIEVE FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANENA.

A.(5) ITALIAN ARMED FORCES COULD NOT DEFEND ITALY IN A MAJOR
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WAR WITHOUT EXTERNAL ASSSISTANCE. CAPABILITIES FOR SUSTAINED
COMBAT ARE SEVERELY LIMITED BY SHORTAGES AND SOME OBSOLESCENCE

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FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4394
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ROME 13449

JCS FOR J-5: USCINCEUR FOR ECJ4/7

PASS ACDA AND AID

OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT, INSUFFICIENT TRAINING OF DRAFTEES
DUE TO A SHORT CONSCRIPTION PERIOD, SHORTCOMINGS IN COMMUNICATIONS
CAPABILITIES, SOME SHORTAGES OF QUALIFIED TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
AND INADEQUATE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. THE ARMED FORCES ARE
CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITIES BUT ARE
HINDERED BY INSUFFICIENT FUNDS AND SERIOUS INFLATION. DURING
RECENT YEARS "PROMOTIONAL LAWS" DESIGNED TO MODERNIZE THE
ITALIAN ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE WERE PASSED BY THE PARLIAMENT.
THESE WILL, RESULT IN MODERNIZATION OF FORCES, BUT IN NO
SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED LONG-TERM CAPABILITY IN SUPPORT OF NATO.
A. (6) REF (F) CONTAINS ANALYSIS OF ITALIAN DEFENSE BUDGET
FOR 1978, THE LAST YEAR FOR WHICH FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE.
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE ESTIMATED TO BE 2.5 PERCENT OF GNP.
REF (G) CONTAINS ANALYSIS OF ITALY'S FINANCIAL POSITION AS OF
1977.

A. (7)-A.(9). NA

A.(10) NO IMPACT ON ARMS CONTROLS IS ENVISIONED FOR ANY OF
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THE POTENTIAL FMS SALES INDICATED IN THE MILITARY SECURITY
ASSISTANCE PROJECTION (MSAP) FY 1980-84.

AM KQQL IN A COUNTRY SUCH AS ITALY, IT IS BELIEVED THAT SALE
OF MATERIAL INDICATED IN MSAP WOULD IN NO WAY JEOPARDIZE
ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES.

A. (12) OTHER THAN IN THE FORM OF LOANS (E.GN IMF) ITALY
RECEIVES NO OUTSIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. REF (G) DESCRIBED
ITALIAN FINANCIAL POSITION. THERE IS NO MILITARY ASSISTANCE,
AS SUCH, FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. ALL ACQUISITIONS ARE PURCHASES.

. (13)(A)-A.(13)(E). NA

A.(13)(F) INASMUCH AS ROME WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ADDRESS
PROGRAM LEVELS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 3.A. (13) (A) THROUGH
3.A.(13)(E) OF REF (A), MANNING LEVEL PROPOSED WILL BE BASED ON
CONTINUATION OF CURRENT PROGRAM (FMS CASH ONLY). CURRENT
AUTHORIZATION MANNING OF 3(THREE) MILITARY OFFICERS, 2(TWO)
EPT OF ARMY CIVILIANS AND 5(FIVE) LOCAL HIRE IS CONSIDERED THE
MINIMUM TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE EXISTING PROGRAM. EASH
BILLET CURRENTLY HAS AS ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION SECURITY ASSISTANCE
ACTIVITIES. AS THE CURRENT PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO BE MAINTAINED
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, NO CHANGE IS PROPOSED. GARNER

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